Learning to Disentangle Robust and Vulnerable Features for Adversarial
  Detection by Joe, Byunggill et al.
Learning to Disentangle Robust and Vulnerable
Features for Adversarial Detection
Byunggill Joe
KAIST
cp4419@kaist.ac.kr
Sung Ju Hwang
KAIST
sjhwang82@kaist.ac.kr
Insik Shin
KAIST
insik.shin@kaist.ac.kr
Abstract
Although deep neural networks have shown promising performances on various
tasks, even achieving human-level performance on some, they are shown to be
susceptible to incorrect predictions even with imperceptibly small perturbations
to an input. There exists a large number of previous works which proposed to
defend against such adversarial attacks either by robust inference or detection of
adversarial inputs. Yet, most of them cannot effectively defend against whitebox
attacks where an adversary has a knowledge of the model and defense. More
importantly, they do not provide a convincing reason why the generated adversarial
inputs successfully fool the target models. To address these shortcomings of the
existing approaches, we hypothesize that the adversarial inputs are tied to latent
features that are susceptible to adversarial perturbation, which we call vulnerable
features. Then based on this intuition, we propose a minimax game formulation
to disentangle the latent features of each instance into robust and vulnerable ones,
using variational autoencoders with two latent spaces. We thoroughly validate our
model for both blackbox and whitebox attacks on MNIST, Fashion MNIST5, and
Cat & Dog datasets, whose results show that the adversarial inputs cannot bypass
our detector without changing its semantics, in which case the attack has failed.
1 Introduction
Although deep neural networks have achieved impressive performances on many tasks, sometimes
even surpassing human performance, researchers have found that they could be easily fooled by even
slight perturbations of inputs. Adversarial examples, which are deliberately generated to change
the output without inducing semantic changes in the perspective of human perception [1, 2], can
sometimes bring down the accuracy of the model to zero percent. Many of previous work try to solve
this problem in the forms of robust inference [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8], which aims to obtain correct results
even with the adversarial inputs, or by detecting adversarial inputs [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15].
However most of previous works do not work properly in whitebox attack scenarios where the
adversary has the same knowledge as a defender. Most of the past defenses which at a time
successfully defended against adversarial attacks were later broken. For example, adversarial defenses
leveraging randomness, obfuscated gradients, input denoising, and neuron activations which were
once deemed as robust, were later broken with sophisticated whitebox attacks such as expectation
over transformation or backward pass differentiable approximation [16, 17].
We hypothesize that the malfunctions of the previous defenses are caused by the existence of features
that are more susceptible to adversarial perturbations, which misguide the model to make incorrect
predictions. Such a concept of vulnerable features has been addressed in a few existing works [18, 19].
These approaches define vulnerability of the input features either based on the human perception,
based on the amount of perturbation at the network output, or correlation with the label. Yet, our
hypothesis has a different perspective of vulnerability/robustness in that we assume that there exists
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a latent feature space where adversarial inputs to a label form a common latent distribution. That
is, vulnerable and robust features by our definition are not input features, but rather latent features
residing in hypothetical spaces. While vulnerability/robustness of features are assumed as given and
fixed in the existing work, this redefinition allows us to explicitly learn to disentangle features into
robust and vulnerable features by learning their feature spaces.
Benign
Adversarial
Disentangled feature
learning
Implicit feature
learning
Figure 1: Latent spaces of features
Toward this goal, we propose a variational autoencoder with
two latent feature spaces, for robust and vulnerable features
respectively. Then, we train this model using a two-player
mini-max game, where the adversary tries to maximize the
probability that the adversarially perturbed instances are in
the robust feature space, and the defender tries to minimize
this probability. This procedure of learning to disentangle
robust and vulnerable features further allows us to detect
features based on their likelihood of the feature belonging to
either of the two feature categories (see Figure 1).
We validate our model on multiple datasets, namely MNIST [20], Fashion MNIST5 [21], and Cat &
Dog [22], and show that the attacks cannot bypass our detector without incurring semantic changes
to the input images, in which the attack has failed.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1. We empirically show that adversarial attacks are negative side effects of vulnerable features,
which is the byproduct of implicit representation learning algorithms.
2. From the above empirical observation, we hypothesize that different adversarial inputs to a
label form a common latent distribution.
3. Based on this hypothesis, we propose a new defense mechanism based on variational
autoencoders with two latent spaces, and a two-player mini-max game to learn the two latent
spaces, for robust and vulnerable features each, and use it as an adversarial input detector.
4. We conduct blackbox and whitebox attacks to our detector and show that adversarial
examples cannot bypass it without inducing semantic changes, which means attack failure.
2 Related work
After revealing severe defects of neural networks against adversarial inputs[1, 2], researchers have
found more sophisticated attacks to fool the neural networks[2, 4, 23, 24, 25, 26]. On the other
side, many researchers have tried to propose a defense mechanism against such attacks as a form of
robust prediction [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] or detector of adversarial inputs [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. Many
of them rely on randomness, obfuscated gradients, or distribution of neuron activations, which are
known to malfunction under adaptive whitebox attacks [16, 17]. Some of previous works studied
root causes of this intriguing defects. Goodfellow et al.[2] suggest there should be vulnerability in
benign input distributions with an interpretation of deep neural networks as linear classifiers. Tsipras
et al.[18] further propose a dichotomy of robust feature and non-robust feature. They analyze the
intrinsic trade-off between robustness and accuracy. Concurrent to this work, Ilyas et al.[19] find
that non-robust features suffice for achieving good accuracy on benign inputs. They also provide a
theoretical framework to analyze the non-robust features. On the other hand, we provide a hypothesis
about latent distributions of vulnerable features, and disentangle vulnerable latent space from the
entire latent feature space under adaptive whitebox attacks.
3 Background and Motivational Experiment
Premise. The key premise of our proposed framework is that standard neural-network classifiers
implicitly learn two types of features: robust and vulnerable features. The robust features, in an
intuitive sense, correspond to signals that make semantic sense to humans, which may describe
texture, colors, local shapes or patches in image domain. The vulnerable features are considered as
imperceptible to human senses but are leveraged by models for prediction since they help lowering
the training loss. We posit that adversarial attacks exploit vulnerable features to imperceptibly perturb
inputs that induce erroneous prediction.
2
Notation. We now present notations used throughout this paper. Firstly, x ∈ IRd is an input in d
dimensions. We distinguish x between benign input xb and adversarial input xa = xb + δ, where
δ ∈ S = {δ | ||δ||p < }. Typical p is one of 0, 1, 2, and∞. We use an ordered set X with matching
subscripts b and a to indicate a set of xb and xa and with superscript c to indicate label c. Given an
input xb, the true label of xb is yb, and ya is an inaccurate (misled) label of corresponding xa. Yb
and Ya are ordered sets of labels of xb and xa that have the same indice in Xb and Xa. The number
of unique labels in classification is N . We denote a dataset as a pair (X , Y ). P cr and P
c
v are the
probatility density functions of robust features and vulnerable features respectively for the inputs of
label c. θc is a set of model parameters of a variational autoencoder for label c (i.e., VAEc).
Attack methods. We briefly explain representative attack methods used in this paper.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) is an one step method proposed by Goodfellow et al. [2].
L(x, y) is a training loss. The attack takes sign of∇L(x, y) and perturbs the x with a size parameter
 to increase L(x, y), resulting in an unexpected result.
xa = x+  · sign(∇L(x, y))
Projected Gradient Decent (PGD) is an iterative version of the FGSM attack with random start [4].
To generate xt+1a , the attack perturbs x
t
a with a step size parameter α based on the sign of∇L(xta, y).
It limits its search space in the input space of x+S, which is implemented as a clipping function with
a L∞ bound. It can initialize the attack, adding uniform noise to an original image, x0a = x+ U(S).
xt+1a =
∏
x+S
(xta + α · sign(∇L(xta, y)))
Momentum Iterative Method (MIM) introduces concept of momentum to the PGD attack [23].
Instead of directly updating xta from ∇L(xt, y), it applies previous gt value with decay factor µ to
gt+1. Then it updates xt+1a with the sign of g
t+1 and the step size α, while limiting search space in
x+ S.
gt+1 = µ · gt + ∇L(x
t
a, y)
||∇L(xta, y)||1
, xt+1a =
∏
x+S
(xta + α · sign(gt+1))
Carlini & Wagner Method (CW-L2) [24] introduces w and searches adversarial inputs on the w
space, because it relaxes discontinuous property at the minimum and maximum input values. To
minimize the distortion of adversarial inputs, it incorporates a L2 loss term, || 12 (tanh(w) + 1)− x||22.
It defines a function f(x′) to induce miss-classification, where Z(x′)i is the logit value of label i
right before a softmax layer, and t is a label of the original input x. The κ is for larger differences
in logit values, resulting in high confidence. It balances between L2 loss and f(x′) loss in a binary
search of c.
minw||1
2
(tanh(w)+1)−x||22+c·f(tanh(w)+1), f(x′) = max(max(Z(x′)i : i 6= t)−Z(x′)t,−κ)
3.1 Vulnerability of Implicit Feature Learning
By showing that the vulnerable features are prevalent in benign datasets (Xb, Yb), we validate our
argument that the implicit learning algorithms may lead models to learn vulnerable features that
could be exploited by an adversary, without explicit regularizations to prevent learning of them. We
now provide an evidence in support of this, where a benign dataset (Xb, Yb) can be classified with
good accuracy by a classifier Fv which is trained with a dataset (Xv ,Yv) only containing vulnerable
features.
The basic idea to construct (Xv , Yv) for Fv is to leverage a dataset of adversarial inputs (Xa,Ya) that
an arbitrary attack A generates, to fool a classifier Fp pre-trained with (Xb, Yb), where Ya is a set of
incorrect labels. The set of adversarial inputs Xa cause F to make erroneous prediction toward a
target label y. That is, each Xa contains a set of vulnerable features that Fp learned to identify y,
because the features do not contain any semantically meaningful features of y (see Figure 2). Based
on this reasoning, we construct (Xv, Yv) by attacking Fp and accumulating a set of Xa with the
inaccurate labels Ya. For clarity, (Xv, Yv) should not contain robust features; it should not include
benign inputs and should not allow large distortions that could change the semantics of the inputs.
3
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Figure 2: Examples of vulnerable feature dataset (Xv , Yv) generated by the CW-L2_d attack
Table 1: Performance of a classifier Fv trained only with vulnerable feature dataset (Xv , Yv)
MNIST Fashion MNIST5
FGSM_d PGD_d MIM_d CW-L2_d FGSM_d PGD_d MIM_d CW-L2_d
TestXb accuracy 0.37 0.85 0.92 0.98 0.53 0.71 0.78 0.78
TestXv accuracy 0.54 0.81 0.73 0.96 1.0 0.95 0.93 1.0
# of iterations 2 7 30 30 3 30 30 30
D loss term ofA1 −100D(x) −10D(x) −2D(x) 0.5D(x) −10D(x) −10D(x) −1D(x) 0.5D(x)
To make the accumulation process efficient, we introduce a discriminator D which learns the
vulnerable features in (Xv , Yv) and prevents the attack A from re-exploiting the vulnerable features
that has already learned. The attack A should then bypass D, which is only possible with exploiting
a new set of vulnerable features. After a pre-determined number of iterations for accumulation, we
train Fv with (Xv, Yv) and measure the performance of Fv on (Xb, Yb) and test datasets (X ′v, Y
′
v).
We conduct this experiment 2 with two datasets, MNIST and Fashion MNIST5. In the case of Fashion
MNIST5, we use a subset of Fashion MNIST [21] which are "Coat (0)", "Trouser (1)", "Sandal (2)",
"Sneaker (3)", and "Bag (4)". Figure 2 illustrates vulnerable feature datasets (Xv, Yv) generated
by A. We can see that Xv describes a completely different visual object classes from Yv, as Xv
is comprised of only the vulnerable features. For more details of the experiment, see Table A.1 in
supplementary file.
We use four representative attacks, including FGSM_d, PGD_d, MIM_d, and CW-L2_d, where "_d"
indicates that each individual base attack is adapted to bypass D with an additional attack objective.
Table 1 summarizes the performance of Fv . Interestingly, the results show that it is possible to achieve
high accuracy of up to 0.98 (MNIST) and 0.78 (Fashion MNIST5) on (Xb, Yb), even though they are
trained with (Xv , Yv). We note that Fv also achieves high accuracy on test datasets (X ′v , Y
′
v ), which
are unseen in the training phase.
From the above experiments, we can draw the following two conclusions:
• High accuracy on (Xb, Yb): Vulnerable features are prevalent in (Xb, Yb), and we need new
training algorithms that are able to distinguish vulnerable and robust features for robustness.
• High accuracy on (X ′v, Y ′v ): (Xv, Yv) must share some high-level features in common,
although they may be imperceptible to humans. Based on this observation, we hypothesize
that the adversarial inputs Xv of the same label Yv exist in the common latent distribution.
4 Approach
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Figure 3: Implicit vs. disentangling learning in latent feature spaces (label 0 on MNIST)
0The sign of D loss depends whether an attack uses gradient descent(+) or ascent(-).
2It is worth noting that a similar experiment [19] was conducted independently at the same time. A key
difference is that the experiment in [19] is designed to construct non-robust (vulnerable) input datasets while our
experiment aims to construct a common latent distribution of a maximal set of vulnerable features with D.
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Figure 4: Proposed network architecture for the disentangling learning
Based on the hypothesis that vulnerable features make up a common latent distribution for each label,
we propose a new learning algorithm to recognize and disentangle a latent space of the vulnerable
features from distributions of the all features. Figure 3 shows the difference from an implicit algorithm
(left) that learns latent features z without such distinction.
Specifically, we propose a variational autoencoder with two latent feature spaces zr and zv respectively
for robust and vulnerable features. We regularize zr and zv not to estimate distributions of adversarial
and benign inputs respectively, in addition to an original objective of the variational autoencoder, as
a mini-max game. As the training converges, zr gets close to a distribution of robust features, and
zv represents a distribution of vulnerable features. Then the zv could be used to detect adversarial
inputs, since they will form a distinct distribution in zv that separates them from benign inputs.
4.1 Mini-max game
A key idea of our proposed training can be represented as two-player mini-max game between a
defender and an adversary on the two probability distributions of the robust features P cr and the
vulnerable features P cv of each label c. The defender seeks to detect an adversarial attack on an input
x by checking if P cv (x) is higher than a threshold, and the adversary aims to maliciously perturb the
input x while compromising the detection.
min
θc
max
δ∈S
logP cr (x+ δ) + log(1− P cv (x+ δ))
In the beginning, P cr is initialized to reflect the distribution of all the robust and vulnerable features,
but P cv does not represent a feature. Each player alternately plays the game. In the adversary’s turn,
the adversary perturbs x with δ ∈ S, in order to maximize P cr but minimize P cv to compromise the
defender. In the next turn, the defender controls the model parameter θc to perform the opposite,
aiming to collect all the vulnerable features that have been exploited by the adversary and segregate
them into the distribution of P cv . If the defender successfully detects all the vulnerable features, then
the defender wins the game. Otherwise, the adversary wins. However, since the set of vulnerable
features is finite with the finite size of θc, the defender with a proper detection strategy will eventually
win the game, after a sufficient number of turns.
4.2 Network architecture
To embed the proposed mini-max game in a training process, we suggest a network architecture
described in Figure 4. For each label c, we have a variational autoencoder VAEc[27] that consists of
an encoder Ec(x) and a decoder Dc(x). Instead of one type of latent variables, Ec(x) samples two
types of latent variables zcr and z
c
v for each of benign and adversarial inputs of the label c. We denote
Ec(x) = Ecr(x) · Ecv(x) = zcr(x) · zcv(x) for simplicity. Dc(z) generates xˆ for any given z, where z
is either zcr(x) or z
c
v(x) depending on whether x is xb or xa. The information is given in the training
process as a flag, and Dc(x) can selectively take zcr(xb) or z
c
v(xa) based on the flag.
For classification, we integrate the VAEcs into a classifier F (x). Given an input x, F (x) estimates
probabilities of x on P cr of each VAE
c, and returns an index of the highest probability as the
predicted label yˆ. This process can be denoted as yˆ = F (x) = argmax
c
P cr (z
c
r(x)|x). For the
detection of an adversarial input xa, we utilize the probability of xa on P yˆv relatively compared to
the values of X yˆb , given the predicted label yˆ = F (xa). Specifically, we detect if P
yˆ
v (z
yˆ
v (x)|x) 
P yˆv (z
yˆ
v (xi)|xi),wherexi ∈ X yˆb .
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4.3 Training the network
We train each VAEc with the loss lc. We design lc based on an evidence lower bound of logP cr (xb) +
logP cv (xa) with two regularization terms, which penalize errors in variational inference. Specifically,
when erroneous estimates happen, that is, when Ecr assigns xa with high probability or E
c
v assigns xb
with high probability, VAEc is penalized and encouraged to distinguish between the robust features
of xb and the vulnerable features in xa. We provide the detailed derivation of lc in Section A.2 of the
supplementary file. The final form of lc is as follows, where µi(z) selects the i-th mean element of
z, and σi(z) selects the i-th standard deviation element of z from reparameterization.
lc = ||xb −Dc(Ecr(xb))||2 + ||xa −Dc(Ecv(xa))||2 (Reconstruction loss)
− 1
2
α
|Ecr(xb)|∑
i
(1 + log(σ2i (E
c
r(xb)))− µ2i (Ecr(xb))− σ2i (Ecr(xb))) (KL divergence for zcr)
− 1
2
α
|Ecv(xa)|∑
i
(1 + log(σ2i (E
c
v(xa)))− µ2i (Ecv(xa))− σ2i (Ecv(xa))) (KL divergence for zcv)
− β{log(1−N (Ecr(xa)|0, I)) + log(1−N (Ecv(xb)|0, I))} (zc error penalty)
We choose the pixel-wise mean squared error (MSE) for the first two terms as reconstruction errors,
and the standard normal distribution N (0, I) as priors for P cr and P cv . We also introduce constants
α and β, respectively, for the KL divergence terms and the loss terms of variational inference for a
practical purpose.
Before we train VAEc with lc we should incorporate the knowledge of our defense mechanism to the
existing attacks, considering the whitebox attack model. Given an attack loss lattack of an arbitrary
attack A, we linearly combine a term lpass = max(0, P yˆv (z
yˆ
v (xa)|xa)− Exi∈Xyˆb [P
yˆ
v (z
yˆ
v (x
i)|xi)])
to bypass our detector with a coefficient γ. As a result we get ladapt_attack = lattack ± γlpass. We
also introduce a binary search to find the proper γ in a similar way to the CW-L2 attack. We modify
all the attacks in this paper. We denote an attack with "_W", if the attack is modified to work on
the whitebox model. The sign of the γLv term depends on whether the attack is based on gradient
descent (+), or ascent (-).
Algorithm 1: Training process of VAEc
Xcv ← φ : Set of adversarial inputs to label c
A_W : An adapted whitebox attack
while A_W successes to bypass do
Xcv ← Xcv ∪A_W (Xb −Xcb ,VAEc)
TRAIN VAEc to distinguish Xcb and Xcv
maximizing lc with θc
end while
Algorithm 1 describes our training algorithm. It is
an iterative process, where at each iteration A_W
attacks VAEc to exploit vulnerable features in P cr ,
and the VAEc corrects the distribution P cr and P
c
v
with θc to identify vulnerable features found in
each iteration. We should only attack Xb − Xcb ,
in order to prevent the inclusion of robust features
in P cv . The training ends when A_W can not find
adversarial inputs that could bypass the detector.
5 Experiment
Table 2: (Xb, Yb) accuracy of models
MIM_W CW-L2_W No defense
MNIST 0.97 0.98 0.99
Fashion 0.98 0.98 0.99
MNIST5
Cat & Dog 0.96 0.96 0.99
We evaluate our defense mechanism under both black-
box and whitebox attacks, trained with MIM_W and
CW-L2_W. In the blackbox setting, we evaluate how
precisely our detector filters out adversarial inputs by
measuring AUC scores. In the whitebox setting, we
first quantitatively evaluate attack success ratio and
qualitatively analyze whether successful adversarial
inputs induce semantic changes.
Baseline. We choose Gong et al. [11] as a baseline for comparison, which also leverages adversarial
inputs to train an auxiliary classifier for detecting adversarial inputs. Note that Gong et al. does not
incorporate adaptive attacks in their approach, although we denote it with the same notation (e.g.,
MNIST, A=PGD_W).
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Table 3: AUC scores of blackbox attack detection. Our
approach (left) remains more generalized over various attacks
compared to the baseline (right)
MNIST Fashion MNIST5
MIM_W CW-L2_W MIM_W CW-L2_W
FGSM 0.99 / 0.99 0.98 / 0.99 0.98 / 0.99 0.99 / 0.97
PGD 0.99 / 0.96 0.99 / 0.99 0.97 / 0.79 0.99 / 0.96
MIM 0.99 / 0.90 0.99 / 0.98 0.98 / 0.92 0.99 / 0.97
CW 0.97 / 0.64 0.97 / 0.96 0.96 / 0.64 0.97 / 0.95
MIM
Benign PGD
CW
Figure 5: Disentangled latent distributions
of robust and vulnerable features (blue xb vs.
others xa), on MNIST, A=MIM_W VAEc=3.
Attacks. Our attacks are based on the publicly available implementations [28, 29], and the whitebox
attacks are adapted to bypass our detection mechanism. All adversarial inputs are generated from a
separate test dataset, in an untargeted way.
Datasets. We evaluate our detector on the MNIST [20], Fashion MNIST5 [21], and Cat & Dog [22]
datasets. In the case of the Cat & Dog dataset, we collect total 2028 frontal faces of cats and dogs,
and resize it into 64 x 64 x 1 with a single channel.
We first show that our defense methods achieve a level of accuracy similar to those without defense
mechanisms (see Table 2). Additional information including training parameters and details of the
attacks are described in Section A.3 of the supplementary file.
5.1 Blackbox substitute model attack
In the blackbox setting, the adversary has no information regarding our defense mechanism, but
we assume that the adversary has the same datasets as a defender. The adversary builds its own
standard substitute classifier Fs, and generates a group of adversarial inputs xa with an attack A to
fool Fs. After that, the adversary attacks F with xa, and the defender detects xa based on the values
of P yˆv (z
yˆ
v (xa)|xa) where yˆ = F (xa). The blackbox substitute model attacks are possible exploiting
the transferability [2, 30, 31, 32, 33] of xa over classifiers trained with similar datasets.
Table 3 shows AUC scores for detection results, where each cell compares ours (left) with the baseline
(right) for each individual attack while our defense approaches achieve 0.98 on average and perform
better than the baseline by up to 0.33. We attribute the success of our model to its ability to disentangle
the distribution of the vulnerable features of xa into zv from the distribution of whole features. To see
if the features are actually disentangled, we visualize zc with t-SNE [34] in Figure 5. It shows clear
separation between zcr(x
c
b) and z
c
v(x
c
a) as we expected. We conclude that the transferability between
the models is reduced by disentangling the vulnerable features which the adversary might exploit for
Fs found in benign datasets.
5.2 Whitebox attack
Whitebox attacks are difficult to defend because the adversary has exactly the same knowledge as the
defender, which could be exploited in order to fool the defender. For clear analysis, we define a set of
success conditions C of the adversary when an inference label of xa is yˆ = F (xa), as follows:
C1 Low probability on vulnerable features to bypass the detector: P yˆv (xa) < E[P
yˆ
v (x
yˆ
b )].
C2 High probability on robust features to convince the defender: P yˆr (xa) > E[P
yˆ
r (x
yˆ
b )].
C3 Semantic meaning of the original input should be retained.
Table 4: Result of CW-L2_W attack
MNIST Fashion MNIST5
A MIM_W CW-L2_W MIM_W CW-L2_W
Ratio 0.32 0.28 0.18 0.19
Mean L2 45.08 48.25 43.34 37.66
For C1 and C2, Figure 6 plots attack success ra-
tios along the L∞ distortion on MNIST and Fashion
MNIST5. As L∞ increases, the success ratio also in-
creases except FGSM_W. Our defense shows gradual
slope compared to the baseline. Table 4 shows the white-
box attack result of CW-L2_W with minimized distortions in a binary search. CW-L2_W achieves
average success ratio of 0.30 and 0.19 with L2 distortion3 of 46.66 and 40.5 for MNIST and Fashion
MNIST5, respectively.
3The L2 distortion is calculated as ||δ||2/
√
d in [0, 255] input range.
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Figure 6: Success ratio of whitebox attacks along the L∞ distortion (according to C1 & C2)
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Figure 7: Visual results of whitebox attacks on our defense
2
Gong et al [11], A=MIM_WOurs, A=MIM_W
8 3 3 122 4 9
Reverse Cross Entropy [13]
230
Figure 8: Semantic comparison to baselines[11, 13] under the CW-L2_W attack; the attack yields larger
semantic changes on our approach compared to the baselines4
Regarding C3, Figure 7 compares the visual differences between each pair of a benign image (left)
and an adversarial image (right). The predicted label for each image is shown in yellow, in the
bottom right corner. We choose L∞ = 0.5 as a reference distortion value for the MIM_W attacks.
We can clearly observe the semantic changes on the adversarial images. We additionally evaluate
our defense mechanism on a Cat & Dog dataset. It also shows the semantics changed between
the labels (L∞ = 0.3). Some lines are appeared or disappeared in MNIST rather than noisy dots,
and sneakers turn into sandals with similar styles such as overall shape or pattern. In the case of
Cat & Dog dataset, features of dogs are appearing in the adversarial inputs generated from cats as
big noses and long spouts, while the brightness of the fur, or angles of faces seem to be preserved.
Figure 8 show adversarial perturbations from the attacks result in clear semantic changes with our
approach compared to other baselines. We provide more results obtained with various L∞ including
the PGD_W attack in Section A.4 of the supplementary file. From the result we conclude our
approach successfully distinguishes vulnerable features from whole features compared to the baseline.
Furthermore, considering the semantic changes of adversarial inputs, we conclude that the robust
features estimated in zr are well-aligned with human perception.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we hypothesize about the latent feature space for adversarial inputs of a label and
conjectured that feature space entanglement of vulnerable and robust features is the main reason
of adversarial vulnerability of neural networks, and proposed to learn a space that disentangles the
latent distributions of the vulnerable and robust features. Specifically, we trained a set of variatonal
autoencoders for each label with two latent spaces, and trained them using a two-player mini-max
game, which results in learning disentangled representations for robust and vulnerable features. We
show that our approach successfully identifies the vulnerable features and also identifies sufficiently
robust features in the whitebox attack scenario. However, we cannot guarantee that our approach
is a panacea, and further research is required for the discovery of new attacks. We hope our work
stimulates research toward more reliable and explainable machine learning.
4We found and corrected implementation errors in the robustness evaluation of the reverse cross entropy [13],
and we could bypass the detector in the adaptive whitebox attack. We confirmed it with an author of the paper.
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A Appendix
A.1 Additional information about the motivational experiment
We conducted the motivational experiments described in the Section 3.1 to demonstrate that the
classifier Fv trained with a dataset (Xv,Yv) only containing vulnerable features can achieve high
accuracy on a benign dataset (Xb, Yb). Table 5 and Table 6 describe the model parameters and the
attack parameters used in the experiments. Algorithm 2 details the process of creating (Xv ,Yv) with
the discriminator D.
We use abbreviated notations in Table 5, and Table 6. The "c(x,y)" is a convolutional layer with ReLU
activation. The x is size of a kernel, and the y is the number of kernels. "mp(x)" is a max pooling
layer whose pooling size is x by x. The "d(x)" is a dense layer where x is the number of neurons. The
"sm(x)" is a softmax layer with output dimension x. For the attack parameter, "e" is L∞ epsilon and i
is iteration of attacks. "ss" is a step size of perturbations. "df" is a decay factor for the MIM attack.
"lr", "cf", "ic", "bs" are learning rate, confidence, initial coefficient for the miss-classification loss,
and the number of binary search steps.
For the fashion MNIST5, we intentionally choose the subset of Fashion MNIST such as coat (0),
trouser (1), sandal (2), sneaker (3), bag (4) for decreasing effect of inter-label robust features. For
example, sneaker and ankle boot, coat and pull over are quite similar. By doing so, we could extract
vulnerable features only for each label and get an accurate result.
We implement the discriminator D as a separate model with one dimension of sigmoid output. The
D learns to distinguish benign inputs as 0, and adversarial inputs as 1. As a conequence, we can
interpret the output value of D as a probability where an input x would be an adverarial input. In
terms of the bypassing D for attacks, we linearly incorporate the output value of D in objective loss
functions of the attacks. As the attacks minimizing the output probability of D, the attacks generate
new xa with new vulnerable features.
Table 5: Model parameters in the motivational experiment
Models Parameters
MNIST, Fp c(2,20) mp(2) c(2,50) mp(2) d(500) sm(10)
MNIST, Fv c(5,20) mp(2) c(5,50) mp(2) d(256) sm(10)
Fashion MNIST5, Fp c(5,20) mp(2) c(5,50) mp(2) d(500) sm(10)
Fashion MNIST5, Fv c(5,20) mp(2) c(5,50) mp(2) d(256) sm(10)
Table 6: Attack parameters in the motivational experiment
Blackbox substitute model attacks
FGSM PGD MIM CW-L2
MNIST e:0.3 e:0.3, i:90, e:0.3, i:640, i:160, lr:0.1
ss:0.01 ss:0.01, df:0.3 cf:3, ic:10, bs:1
Fashion e:0.3 e:0.4, i:90 e:0.3 , i:320 i:160, lr:0.1
MNIST5 ss:0.01 ss:0.001, df:0.3 cf:3, ic:10, bs:1
A.2 Training loss derivation
To approximate and distinguish the latent variable distributions of zcr and z
c
v, we maximize
ELBO(Lc) for each VAEc, where
Lc = LcE + L
c
I (1)
Lc consists of two terms. The first one is an evidence term LcE indicating the probability of occurence
of xb and xa, where
LcE = logP
c
r (xb) + logP
c
v (xa) (2)
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Algorithm 2: Training process only with the vulnerable features Xv
(Xb, Yb): Given benign dataset
(Xv , Yv)← (φ, φ): Empty dataset for vulnerable features
F, F ′ : Pre-trained and initialized model respectively with same input and output dimensions
A : Arbitrary attack
D : Discriminator between benign (0) and adversarial (1) inputs
while i < limit do
Xiv, Y
i
v ← A(Xb, Yb, F,D)
(Xv, Yv)← (Xv ∪Xiv, Yv ∪ Y iv )
TRAIN D to distinguish Xb and Xv
end while
TRAIN F ′ with Xv and Yv
PRINT accuracy of F ′ on Xb and Yb
The second one is a loss term of variational inference which penalizes in the case of wrong variation
inference to each distribution P cr and P
c
v . It can be expanded to incorporate latent variables z
c
r and z
c
v
as follows.
LcI = log(1− P cr (xa)) + log(1− P cv (xb))
= log(1−
∑
zcr(xa)
P cr (xa)P
c
r (z
c
r(xa)|xa)) + log(1−
∑
zcv(xb)
P cv (xb)P
c
v (z
c
v(xb)|xb))
= log(1− E[P cr (zcr(xa)|xa)]) + log(1− E[P cv (zcv(xb)|xb)])
(3)
Plugging typical ELBO expansion [27] of the LcE term, and the L
c
I term into the equation 1, we get
following ELBO(Lc).
Lc ≥E[logP cr (xb|zcr(xb))] + E[logP cv (xa|zcv(xa))]
−KL[qcr(zcr(xb)|xb)||P cr (zcr(xb))]−KL[qcv(zcv(xa)|xa)||P cv (zcv(xa))]
+ log(1− E[P cr (zcr(xa)|xa)]) + log(1− E[P cv (zcv(xb)|xb)])
= ELBO(Lc)
(4)
lc =||xb −Dc(Ecr(xb))||2 + ||xa −Dc(Ecv(xa))||2
− 1
2
α
|Ecr(xb)|∑
i
(1 + log(σ2i (E
c
r(xb)))− µ2i (Ecr(xb))− σ2i (Ecr(xb)))
− 1
2
α
|Ecv(xa)|∑
i
(1 + log(σ2i (E
c
v(xa)))− µ2i (Ecv(xa))− σ2i (Ecv(xa)))
− β{log(1−N (Ecr(xa)|0, I)) + log(1−N (Ecv(xb)|0, I))}
(5)
We choose the pixel-wise mean squared error (MSE) for the first two terms as reconstruction errors,
and the standard normal distribution N (0, I) as priors for P cr and P cv . We also introduce constants
α and β, respectively, for the KL divergence terms and the loss terms of variational inference for a
practical purpose.
A.3 Training and attack parameters
We use abbreviated notations in Table 7 as like in Table 5 In additionto that the "z(x,y)" is a sampling
layer for latent variables. The x and y are dimensions of zr and zv. We use α = 1 and β = 100
in all trainings. For the label inference we choose the nearest mean classifier on P cr , because its
linear property prevents the vanishing gradients problem which makes attacks fail but known to be
penetrable.
A.4 Additional figures about the whitebox attacks
In this section, we qualitatively evaluate the performance of our proposed defense mechanism against
whitebox attacks as a function of epsilon. Figures 9, 10, and 11 show the results of the PGD_W and
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Table 7: Training parameters and accuracy of Xb with/without our defense. (e:L∞ distortion,
i:iterations, ss:step_size, df:decay_factor, bs:binary_search_steps, lr:learning_rate, cf:confidence,
ic:initial_constant)
Model Parameters
MNIST,A=MIM_W Ec:3(c(4,16))z(8,8) e:0.5, i:3e3, ss:1e-3, df:0.9, bs:0
MNIST,A=CW-L2_W Dc:d(24)d(49)3(ct(4,16))d(784) i:1e3, lr:1e-3, cf:0, ic:1, bs:0
Fashion MNIST5,A=MIM_W Ec:3(c(4,32))z(8,8) e:0.5, i:3e3, ss:1e-3, df:0.9, bs:0
Fashion MNIST5,A=CW-L2_W Dc:d(24)d(49)3(ct(4,32))d(784) i:2e3, lr:1e-3, cf:0, ic:1, bs:0
Cat & Dog,A=MIM_W Ec:2(c(12,32)-bn-relu-mp(2))c(12,32)-bn-relu-z(64,64) e:0.2, i:12e2, ss:1e-3, df:0.9, bs:0
Cat & Dog,A=CW-L2_W Dc:d(24)d(49)3(ct(4,64))d(4096) i:3e3, lr:3e-3, cf:0, ic:1, bs:0
Table 8: Attack parameters used in the experiments
Blackbox substitute model attacks Whitebox attacks
FGSM PGD MIM CW-L2 FGSM_W PGD_W MIM_W CW-L2_W
MNIST e:0.3 e:0.4, i:90, e:0.3, i:160, i:160, lr:0.1 bs:3 i:240, ss:0.01, i:1200,bss:1e-3, i:1.2e4, lr:0.01
ss:0.01 ss:0.01, df:0.3 cf:3, ic:10, bs:1 bs:3 df:0.9, bs:3 cf:200, ic:10, bs:3
Fashion e:0.3 e:0.4, i:90 e:0.3 , i:160 i:160, lr:0.1 bs:3 i:240, ss:0.01, i:1200, ss:1e-3, i:1.2e4, lr:0.01
MNIST5 ss:0.01 ss:0.01, df:0.3 cf:3, ic:10, bs:1 bs:3 df:0.9, bs:3 cf:200, ic:10, bs:3
MIM_W attacks under a wide range of the epsilon from 0.2 to 0.8. Even when the value of the epsilon
is small, there are many cases where one may make mistake. As the epsilon becomes larger, semantic
changes become more apparent. In the case of MNIST, attacks frequently occurred to 4, 7, 9, 3, and
5, which are of similar shapes. In Fashion MNIST5, attacks also frequently occurred to similar forms
such as sandals and sneakers. The attack between the sandals and the sneakers shows that the original
style is maintained to some extent, and a new image is created. In Cat & Dog, when a cat image
was attacked towards a dog, it was found that dog nose and long spout typically appeared. On the
other hand, when dog images were attacked towards a cat, flat nose and Y-shaped mouth appeared.
Especially, when the epsilon is very large up to 0.8, the robust and the vulnerable features are well
learned when we see that the semantically meaningful change is dominant and no perturbation like
noise is added in the background.
MNIST, A=MIM_W MNIST, A=CW_W
MIM_W
0.2
MIM_W
0.4
MIM_W
0.6
MIM_W
0.8
PGD_W
0.2
PGD_W
0.4
PGD_W
0.6
PGD_W
0.8
Attack eps
97 94 2 897
94 95 9 857
64 23 9 724
35 28 4 606
94 94 9 944
94 85 9 648
27 06 6 325
81 60 8 286
35 94 8 933
78 56 9 984
93 71 7 593
56 62 7 494
94 35 9 537
97 56 5 491
72 71 5 246
12 50 2 084
Figure 9: Whitebox attack changes semantics of inputs (MNIST)
[h]
Figure 12 depicts the attack success ratio (according to C1 & C2) on the Cag & Dog dataset as a
function of epsilon. Unlike MNIST and Fashion MNIST5, the success ratio is not so high. This can
be interpreted to mean that the Cat & Dog dataset has more delicate semantic features (i.e., robust
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Figure 10: Whitebox attack changes semantics of inputs (Fashion MNIST)
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Figure 11: Whitebox attack changes semantics of inputs (Cat & Dog)
features) compared to the other datasets, and it is more difficult for attackers to detect them during
perturbation.
In terms of the comparison of the state of the art, our defense mechanism shows clear semantic
changes against the attacks. For example Gong et al.’s auxiliarty classifier as a detector does not
induce any robustness under adaptive whatbox attacks, and Reverse cross entropy which tries to
impose non-maximal entropy in training phase, also does not work in whitebox attack unlike with the
report in the paper. Actually it could not show significant robustness increase comapared to the Gong
et al.’s approach in terms of the amount of distortion and semantic changes (see Figure 13).
A.5 Experiment environments
We conduct our experiments on Ubuntu 16.04 machine with 4 GTX 1080 ti graphic cards and 64GB
RAM installed. We build our experiments with tensorflow version 1.12.0, on python version 3.6.8.
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FGSM_W PGD_W MIM_W
Cat & Dog, A=MIM_W Cat & Dog, A=CW_W
Figure 12: Whitebox attack success ratio along the L∞ distortion (Cat & Dog).
Gong et al. [11] RCE [13] Ours
MNIST
Figure 13: Baseline comparison on MIM_W whitebox attack success ratio (C1, C2) along the L∞
distortion. Gong et al. and Ours are trained with MIM_W attack
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